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1. Introduction
Tax competition is much discussed in the political arena these days. Although it is not a new
phenomenon, the political pressure has increased to restrict tax competition by intensifying
tax coordination and accomplishing tax harmonization. This particularly holds for the EU
which has established a Code of Conduct for business taxation in 1997 and is about to estab-
lish a system of information exchange with respect to capital income taxation (allowing Aus-
tria, Belgium and Luxembourg a minimum source tax on capital income as an alternative). In
2001, the Commission has additionally released the so called ‚Ruding II‘-report in which a
uniform corporate tax base with formulary apportionment is proposed for the EU. In addition,
the OECD (1998) aims at stronger tax coordination among its members also favoring a sys-
tem of information exchange. Such a system would necessarily involve the abolishment of (or
the reduction of the strictness of) bank secrecy laws around the world (Feld 2002).
The starting point of discussions about tax competition is the supposed ‚race to the bottom‘ in
company taxation. It is usually argued that the increased capital mobility that follows from
globalization provides incentives for states to reduce tax rates in order to attract businesses.
Keeping other things equal, firms choose their location in countries with lower corporate in-
come tax rates. The strategic reduction of tax rates of one country induces another country,
perhaps the one in which a firm already has branches, to follow suit such that a ruinous com-
petition between states presumably results. Consequently, public services are said to be pro-
vided inefficiently and capital owners are accused of not paying their ‚fair‘ share of taxes.
Income redistribution may not be financed to the same extent as before and welfare states are
under pressure. These are the fears of the governments of European welfare states.
Often, descriptive empirical evidence is taken to trace such a race to the bottom of taxes over
time. For example, the OECD tax ratios are used to argue that the share of corporate income
taxes has declined over time while labor taxation has increased. These macroeconomic tax
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ratios do however not provide reliable evidence on tax burdens of firms because they reflect
the interaction of tax policy, location choice and general business development. The ratios are
calculated as the tax revenue from corporate income taxes divided by GDP. Tax revenue re-
sults from multiplying statutory tax rates with individual tax bases and summing it over the
number of taxpayers. Corporate tax bases are however particularly sensitive to business cycle
developments such that the base depends on GDP. Changes in tax ratios may thus result from
changes in tax rates, in the definition of tax bases, in the number of taxpayers and in GDP.
Indeed, tax ratios to a large extent reflect business cycle developments.
Figure 1: Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates in Percent,
16 OECD Countries, 1982 and 2001
Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002)
A look at statutory corporate income tax rates in selected OECD countries (Figure 1) reveals
that one of the components of tax ratios has declined markedly in recent decades. On average,
they fell from 47.9 percent in 1982 to 33.9 percent in 2001. For some countries, like Austria
(A), Finland (Fin) and Sweden (S) but also Germany (D), the reduction is even more impor-
tant. Only Italy (I) and Spain (E) have slightly increased their statutory corporate tax rates
during these decades, while Ireland (Irl) has remained at a very low level. Investment by firms
is however not only influenced by statutory tax rates. Firms consider the actual tax burden
that is levied on new investment projects including any kind of tax deductions and relieves.
The actual tax burden is measured by effective tax rates which are calculated on the basis of
tax rate and tax base differentials. If a plant has already been established, firms take marginal
investment decisions and consider marginal effective tax rates. Location choice, on the other
hand, is a total decision such that average effective tax rates have an impact on firms‘ loca-
tion decisions. Average effective corporate tax rates of selected OECD countries are shown in
Figure 2. They fell even more strongly from 42 percent in 1982 to 28.3 percent in 2001 on
average. Again Finland, Sweden, Austria and Germany, but also Portugal (P) are the countries
with strongest reductions in effective tax burdens. Statutory tax rates are nevertheless impor-
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transfer pricing. In addition, statutory rates serve as signals for foreign firms which do not
sufficiently know the details of another country’s tax code. Thus, the two figures perfectly
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Figure 2: Effective Average Corporate Tax Rates in Percent,
16 OECD Countries, 1982 and 2001
Source: Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002)
This descriptive evidence is taken by governments of EU welfare states as supporting the
fears of a race to the bottom. It provides the basis for the political supply side, i.e. for finance
ministers and the Commission, to develop far-reaching proposals for tax harmonization in
Europe. Additional pressure to harmonize corporate taxation also originates from the demand
side of the political process. Multinational firms often argue that international differences in
tax laws impose strong transaction costs and hence distort international investment decisions.
Neither the descriptive evidence from Figures 1 and 2 nor the anecdotal evidence provided by
multinationals suffices however to support such claims for tax harmonization. Any sober dis-
cussion of tax competition requires instead to, first, find out what impact tax competition may
have on the allocation of scarce resources and how it may affect income redistribution by the
state. Second, it is necessary to provide evidence for or against the arguments that are brought
forward in the discussion. Hence, empirical evidence should be provided on the existence and
the actual economic impact of tax competition. The questions that need to be asked are: How
does tax competition work? What is the impact of tax competition on the efficiency of public
goods‘ provision and on the effectiveness of income redistribution? Is there any influence of
tax competition on regional convergence and economic growth? And finally: Could tax com-
petition, in analogy to competition in private markets, serve as a discovery procedure in the
public sector such that better public policies are more quickly detected and diffused?
In this paper, these issues are discussed by starting with the potential influence of tax compe-
tition on the efficiency of the public sector, the effectiveness of income redistribution and– 4 –
economic growth (Section 2). The hypotheses that follow from this theoretical discussion are
confronted with the results from econometric studies that provide more systematic empirical
results than the above-mentioned descriptive evidence. In Section 3, the empirical evidence on
the existence of tax competition is surveyed, while an overview on empirical tests of the ef-
fects of tax competition is presented in Section 4. Finally, a summary and some policy impli-
cations follow in Section 5.
2. Possible Effects of Fiscal Competition
2.1. A Primer on Fiscal Competition
Although the political discussion is mainly about tax competition, it must be recognized at the
outset of the analysis that the state is also offering public services in exchange for the taxes
that citizens pay and hence provides a bundle of goods and services for certain tax prices. In
the following, fiscal competition is therefore discussed instead of tax competition. This switch
in the terminology allows to avoid many mis-understandings that often come up in the politi-
cal and scientific debates. Given that clarification, the analysis of fiscal competition can natu-
rally start from drawing an analogy between competition in private markets and competition
between states. Since A. Smith (1776), economists perceive competition as the driving force
for efficient market outcomes. The invisible hand leads private actors to follow individual
preferences. In a dynamic perspective, competition serves as a discovery procedure and in-
duces useful innovation and technological change. Competition is thus necessary for a grow-
ing economy. Tiebout (1956) argues that competition between jurisdictions works in a similar
fashion. In a global world, different countries offer different tax rates and different levels of
public services to mobile factors of production. Mobile production factors can choose their
location or residence in a country whose public sector supply best fits their preferences and
interests. Individuals and firms vote by feet and thereby reveal their preferences for public
goods. This leads to an efficient provision of public services under certain conditions.
In addition, decentralized provision and financing of public services allows to use decentral-
ized information to the largest possible extent. The closer a government is to the people, the
better it is informed about their wishes and demands. Decentrally dispersed knowledge about
public problem solutions can thus be used more efficiently (Kerber 1998). Finally, the frus-
tration of citizens about public policy solutions is minimized, the more decentralized public
goods‘ provision is. Finding median preferences across the national populace necessarily in-
volves less differentiation among individuals. Decentralization allows to differentiate public
goods and services such that those who want to have more or a better quality of public goods
can move to the jurisdiction with higher levels of publicly provided goods. Citizens are will-
ing to pay higher prices for that offer and could thus be charged higher tax prices. Similarly
those who want to have less can move to jurisdictions with lower levels of public services.
The migration process leads to more homogeneous jurisdictions and to lower frustration costs.
In general, these arguments hold for competition between national, regional or local jurisdic-
tions as well as for labor and capital alike.– 5 –
Oates (1972, p. 30) consequently proposes his decentralization theorem according to which a
decentralized provision and financing of public goods at the lowest possible level is efficient
in a world of high mobility of production factors and people with different preferences. How-
ever, the decentralization theorem only holds if the correspondence principle (Oates 1972) or
the principle of fiscal equivalence (Olson 1969) is respected. Both principles similarly require
that the jurisdiction that decides upon the level of public services should comprise the con-
sumers of that good and those that carry the costs as taxpayers. Only in this case, the sum of
the marginal willingnesses to pay for public goods corresponds to the marginal tax price.
Whenever the principle of fiscal equivalence is violated, decentralized provision and financ-
ing of public goods may lead to inefficiencies. This could be the case if externalities or
economies of scale in consumption exist. Moreover, equity issues may pose problems for a
competitive provision and financing of public services.
2.2. Externalities and Economies of Scale
Externalities from fiscal competition might result in the form of regional or fiscal external-
ities. Regional externalities are comprised of positive or negative benefit spillovers as well as
cost spillovers. Positive benefit spillovers come up for example if Dutch tourists use the Ger-
man highway system, but do not contribute according to their marginal willingness to pay.
Congestion externalities will arise. Negative benefit spillovers may exist in the case of cross-
border pollution. Cost spillovers exist in the case of tax exporting, for example if multina-
tional corporations whose shares are internationally distributed are taxed in a particular coun-
try. Because the shareholders of a multinational company cannot participate to the same ex-
tent in the political process as those of a national corporation, a government has incentives to
raise corporate income taxes to inefficiently high levels above the willingness to pay of the
shareholders of multinationals. The costs of public services are externalized because a part of
the tax burden is paid by residents from other jurisdictions providing incentives for ineffi-
ciently high levels of public services or for excessive taxation (Huizinga and Nielsen 1997).
Fiscal externalities work in the opposite direction of tax exporting. They may arise from
strategic tax competition for mobile capital. Germany is for example in tax competition with
Ireland. If Ireland drops the corporate income tax rate, it attracts German firms. This reloca-
tion reduces the tax burden of the Irish residents because provision costs can be distributed
among more taxpayers. However, the relocation increases the tax burden of German residents
because less taxpayers have to finance that given amount of German public services. If both
countries do not consider the changes in tax burdens in each country when deciding about the
level of public services, fiscal externalities arise (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson
1986). This argument does not hold to the same extent if public infrastructure is becoming an
additional parameter for relocation decisions. Infrastructure is then adjusted in the fiscal com-
petition game such that fiscal externalities might finally vanish (Keen and Marchand 1997).
Moreover, cost or benefit spillovers on the one hand and fiscal externalities on the other hand
might compensate for each other such that public goods can be efficiently provided (Bjorvatn
and Schjelderup 2002, Sørensen 2000, 2004, Noiset 2003). An inefficient provision of public
services might only result if economies of scale (non-rivalness) in consumption exist, i.e.
when the government provides public goods in the Samuelsonian sense (Sinn 2003). Fiscal– 6 –
competition enforces the benefit principle of taxation such that mobile production factors can
only be charged the marginal costs of their use of public goods. Mobile taxpayers do however
not contribute to cover the high inframarginal (fixed) costs of public infrastructure. If this is
not to lead to an inefficiently low level of public services, the fixed costs must be covered by
immobile taxpayers. This can lead to an undesired income distribution.
2.3. Income Redistribution
With respect to personal income redistribution, fiscal competition poses more important prob-
lems. Continue the Germany-Ireland example: Germany presumably has a higher progressiv-
ity of income taxes and pays higher levels of social transfers than Ireland. Income redistribu-
tion is hence more pronounced in Germany than in Ireland. This provides incentives for Irish
social welfare recipients to move to Germany because they can expect higher transfer pay-
ments. High income earners from Germany – ceteris paribus – follow the incentive to emi-
grate to Ireland. These migration incentives impede the decentralized income redistribution at
the national levels (Stigler 1957, Sinn 2003).
There do not exist many theoretical arguments against this reasoning. A frequently heard ar-
gument is that high income and wealthy people have incentives to voluntarily contribute to
the social welfare state in order to obtain social peace (Buchanan 1975). The voluntary in-
come redistribution is the higher the more decentralized the organization of income redistri-
bution is, because recipients are known to or can be more easily identified by contributors.
Many observers question however whether the funds obtained from voluntary contributions to
income redistribution suffice to secure a minimum income of the poor.
2.4. Regional Convergence
In the political discussion, a frequently heard argument focuses on regional instead of per-
sonal income positions. It is contended that fiscal competition results in a situation of poor
regions becoming poorer and rich regions becoming richer. The more ‘good’ taxpayers reside
in a region, the lower the tax burden needs to be to finance a ‘necessary’ amount of infra-
structure. Poor regions however need to increase the tax burden to finance such a ‘necessary’
amount of infrastructure. Fiscal competition then perpetuates income differentials and exacer-
bates the convergence problems of the periphery. Such permanent differences in growth per-
formances will however also prevail if agglomeration economies in central regions exist. The
competition between interregionally active firms induces a concentration of industrial activi-
ties in economic centers because of an interaction between economies of scale in production,
agglomeration economies and diseconomies, and transport costs. Economic activity is more
concentrated in the center while the periphery has below average economic activity. Ludema
and Wooton (2000), Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000) and Baldwin and Krugman (2002)
analyze the impact of tax competition on the economic development of central and peripheral
regions under the conditions normally emphasized by the theory of economic geography. Ag-
glomeration economies in the centers allow them to a certain extent to levy relatively higher
taxes than the periphery without inducing firms to relocate to the periphery with lower taxes.
The periphery has however no other alternative than to attempt at compensating their location
disadvantages by levying lower taxes. A strong decrease of tax rates is necessary to compen-– 7 –
sate for agglomeration advantages of the center. For example, Ireland has followed this policy
in the EU during the last decade and has been very successful. Tax harmonization would then
be harmful because it would exacerbate the resource differences between center and periphery
and easily lead to demands for higher fiscal equalization.
2.5. Alternatives to Tax Competition
These arguments deliberately accept the premise that tax competition describes a clear-cut
behavior in the international fiscal competition game. This is however only a fiction. If tax
rates are not available as policy parameters to attract mobile firms, the other available pa-
rameters will be used. The state may attempt at attracting firms by offering subsidies or tax
holidays. Governments bid for firms. Subsidy competition results if tax competition is pre-
cluded. Such subsidies follow a different rationale. Capital already invested in a certain loca-
tion can be more easily taxed than new investment of multinationals. When considering in-
vestment in a country, multinational enterprises anticipate that they will face problems in re-
patriating location specific investment after it has been undertaken such that a ‚ hold-up‘
problem results. Firms will also anticipate that a danger of excessive taxation results from that
hold-up and will abstain from investing in a country leading to adverse effects on economic
growth. Firms thus aim at obtaining credible commitments from the governments of potential
locations that their location specific rents are not taxed in a confiscatory way. Governments
use the opportunity to commit themselves in order to induce firms to invest in their jurisdic-
tion. They hence offer subsidies or tax holidays to compensate firms for the potential loss
from the expected hold-up (Doyle and van Wijnbergen 1994, Bond and Samuelson 1986,
Black and Hoyt 1989). Janeba (2000, 2002) argues that tax competition solves the problem of
providing credible commitments more efficiently than tax holidays or subsidies. Governments
don’t need to provide subsidies as credible commitments because tax competition reduces
corporate income taxes to a reasonable level. Another alternative to tax and to subsidy com-
petition is a competition in tax enforcement as the most inefficient kind of fiscal competition
for firms. For example, some German states offer a lax tax enforcement to firms in order to
attract them to their jurisdiction because they do not have the possibility of changing tax rates
in the largely harmonized German tax system and are additionally restricted by European law
to offer subsidies to firms. The lax tax enforcement invites tax evasion and tax fraud as the
most detrimental way of avoiding taxation.
2.6. Political Economy Issues
These arguments shed some light on the actual behavior of governments. The state does not
always do what it ought to. Political actors follow their own self-interest and seek to get rents
from the political process. If a government of a member country attempts at securing private
rents by increasing taxes, taxpayers can avoid excessive taxation by migrating to countries
with lower tax burdens. The government cannot increase the tax burden of the mobile factor
above the level of migration costs (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). It therefore has to take the
interests of the mobile factors into account. Fiscal competition preserves a realistic possibility
of migration. Tax harmonization would be counter-productive because it would facilitate the
exploitation of tax bases to Leviathan governments.– 8 –
In addition, fiscal competition enables citizens to comparatively evaluate the performances of
representatives and hence reduce the information asymmetries in political markets (‚yardstick
competition‘). For example, German voters can compare the performance of the German fed-
eral government to that of the French government. If France has a comparably high level and
quality of public services under otherwise same conditions, but offers them at lower tax prices
than Germany, German voters have incentives to throw the German government out of office
at the next election day. The German government will anticipate this threat in its decision to
increase tax rates. Fiscal competition does hence not only work through the migration mecha-
nism, but also improves citizens’ ability to exert voice in the political process (Besley and
Case 1995, Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli 2003, Salmon 2003). The government is forced
to provide public services at relatively lower costs and at the level desired by citizens.
2.7. Political Innovation and Economic Growth
Yardstick competition may also be a mechanism to lead to a dispersion of knowledge in poli-
tics. It is well-known from private markets that competition induces product and process in-
novation. Competition between governments may as well lead to political innovations. Gov-
ernments can experiment with new solutions for economic problems in a decentralized fash-
ion. Better solutions succeed in a process of imitation, copycatting and adaptation by other
jurisdictions. Competition between jurisdictions thus becomes a discovery process which
contributes to the progress in the public sector. Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis already
contended in 1932: „It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country“ (quote by Oates 1999, p. 1132). In
this context Oates (1999) speaks of ‘laboratory federalism’ and points out that the reform of
welfare in the U.S. in 1996 followed these considerations (see Inman and Rubinfeld 1997).
The higher innovative capacity of fiscal competition as a possible explanation for economic
growth of countries is however contested. In a competitive system, a government is re-elected
if it provides services that are at least not worse or not more expensive than those in other
jurisdictions. Each government has incentives to wait initially in order to imitate only those
policies of other jurisdictions that have turned out to be relatively successful. If the govern-
ment of a state is uncertain about re-election, it has an incentive to act as a free-rider with re-
spect to the policy innovations of other jurisdictions finally reducing their absolute amount
(Rose-Ackerman 1980). Schnellenbach (2004) studies the incentives for policy innovations in
systems competition by particularly focusing on the incentives of voters. As voters normally
have little incentives to be politically informed before elections, policy innovations are mainly
possible in times of crises. Citizens’ incentives to become informed on policy innovations are
however improved by high mobility and elements of direct democracy in political decision-
making processes. Political rents of governments can then be reduced by competition, and
politicians can be offered incentives to innovate.
Given these arguments, it could be asked whether fiscal competition or fiscal cooperation
between jurisdictions has an effect on their economic growth. Still, fiscal competition theo-
retically has ambiguous effects because on the one hand it might induce higher efficiency of
public goods’ provision and higher political innovation and hence a better economic perform-– 9 –
ance of jurisdictions. On the other hand, fiscal competition might lead to a migration of mo-
bile production factors to centers of economic activity where agglomeration economies can be
realized such that single poorer regions suffer from that competition.
3. The Existence of Fiscal Competition
All the potential outcomes of fiscal competition discussed in Section 2 need not necessarily
result from fiscal competition in the real world. Solely theoretical arguments do not suffice to
assess whether fiscal competition is harmful or not and whether fiscal harmonization or coop-
eration should be undertaken. It is necessary to shed some light on the empirical validity of
the arguments. Before the impact of fiscal competition on efficiency, redistribution and
growth can be assessed, evidence on the existence of fiscal competition needs to be discussed.
Fiscal competition exists if two conditions are met: First, taxes and public spending play a
significant role in the choice of location of industry and of residence of individuals (mobility
hypothesis). If there is no fiscally induced mobility, neither beneficial nor detrimental effects
of fiscal competition can result. Second, governments actually use fiscal instruments to attract
firms or individuals. If no strategic tax setting can be observed, a race to the bottom cannot
develop (strategy hypothesis).
3.1. Empirical Evidence on Location Choice
The evidence on fiscal induced capital mobility is clearly speaking in favor of fiscal competi-
tion. A large body of evidence that stems from international, regional or local data exists ac-
cording to which taxes and public spending play a role for location decisions of firms. The
weakest evidence is found with respect to foreign direct investments (Feld 2000). More recent
studies by Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) report that international direct
investment of multinational firms depends on corporate income taxes. The higher taxes, the
lower is foreign direct investment. Devereux and Freeman (1995) explain foreign direct in-
vestment in Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the U.S. between
1984 and 1989 by including a rich set of additional explanatory factors. They do however not
find a robust influence of taxes on foreign direct investments if labor market characteristics of
the countries are additionally considered. These inconclusive results might be grounded in the
high aggregation level of foreign direct investment figures or may be attributed to the fact that
statistics on foreign direct investment or on portfolio investment are not reliable.
This has induced an extensive empirical literature on investment behavior of multinational
firms that mainly uses large firm level data sets (Hines 1997). Grubert and Mutti (2000) focus
on new investment of multinationals at particular locations in a cross section analysis for 500
firms in 60 countries in 1992. They find that higher average effective corporate income tax
rates on distributed earnings reduce the probability that multinationals invest in a location.
Altshuler, Grubert and Newlon (2001) find a relatively important impact of effective tax rates
on investment of multinationals in 58 different countries for the years 1984 and 1992. The
relative importance of taxes for international investment has doubled during that period. The
most convincing study on location choice of multinationals has been conducted by Devereux
and Griffith (1998). For more than 1600 firms between 1980 and 1994, they analyze the im-– 10 –
pact of taxes on U.S. multinationals‘ investment in Germany, France or the U.K. as a two step
decision. In the first step, multinationals decide whether to invest at all in Europe. The choice
to invest at home or in Europe is largely independent from taxes and follows along long-term
sales strategies of firms. The second step of the decision consists in the choice of the particu-
lar country if a firm has already decided to invest in Europe. Average effective corporate tax
rates have an important impact on that second decision. Evidence corroborating the impor-
tance of taxes for location choice is found for federal states (see Newman und Sullivan 1988,
Bartik 1991, Wasylenko 1991, Feld 2000 for surveys). Hines (1996) presents evidence that
multinationals locate in U.S. states with lower taxes. Feld and Kirchgässner (2003) study the
impact of personal and corporate income taxes on the distribution of firms between the Swiss
cantons and on cantonal employment. They find significant negative effects of taxes on the
number of small and medium sized firms in different classes of rates of return in 1981/82 and
1991/92 and on cantonal employment between 1985 and 1997. The higher taxes, the lower is
the number of firms and employment. All in all this is strong evidence that international and
interregional location decisions are affected by tax rate differentials.
Tax rate differentials do however not only affect real investment of multinational corpora-
tions. They also have an effect on transfer prices that are set between parent companies and
subsidiaries. If the parent locates in a high tax jurisdiction and the subsidiary is located in the
low tax jurisdiction, the multinational corporation has incentives to set the prices for services
provided by the subsidiary at higher levels in order to reduce profits and thus also taxes paid
in the high tax jurisdiction. For the period 1981 to 1988, Swenson (2001) presents evidence
that multinationals with parent companies in the U.S. and subsidiaries in Germany, France,
the U.K., Japan and Canada increased transfer prices by 8.2 percent on average when foreign
tax rates decreased by one percentage point. Mintz and Smart (2004) present similar evidence
for Canada. Declared taxable profits of firms that have branches in more than one Canadian
province declines by 4.3 percent in the case of tax hikes while otherwise similar firms that
only have branches in one province declare profits that are by 1.6 percent lower. Finally, Gru-
bert and Slemrod (1998) argue that transfer prices are particularly strongly influenced by
taxes if a subsidiary’s specialization is in research and development. In R&D, the internation-
ally accepted dealing at arm’s length principle cannot be used because most of the products of
the subsidiary do not exist in the market such that market prices cannot serve for comparisons.
They present evidence for U.S. parents with R&D subsidiaries in Puerto Rico that their trans-
fer prices strongly depend on tax rate differentials.
3.2. Empirical Evidence on Residence Choice
Support for the mobility hypothesis is also found with respect to migration and residence
choice of individuals. Lower taxes and/or higher levels of public services attract individuals –
ceteris paribus. There is however a first notable difference between location choice and resi-
dence choice. Because capital is internationally more mobile than labor, the international evi-
dence on fiscally induced migration is rather non-existent. This also holds for the EU al-
though mobility between member states has considerably increased. Labor market conditions
and general economic development of a country may serve as the main pull factors in inter-
national migration. Public finance still appears to be too unimportant for most researchers to– 11 –
take it into account. This holds although there is anecdotal evidence from firms which have
difficulties to attract highly qualified people to high tax jurisdictions.
Many empirical studies do however exist for regional or local migration and the impact of
fiscal policy on residence choice of individuals. These studies have been mainly performed by
using U.S. and Swiss data because income tax differentials and differences in public services
are high between the jurisdictions in both countries. For example, someone living in the can-
ton and the city of Zurich who earns a million SFr taxable income per year pays more than
three times the amount of taxes to the canton and the local jurisdiction of Zurich than in the
community of Freienbach in the canton of Schwyz which is only half an hour away from Zu-
rich. Looking at the evidence from federal states is also useful for an assessment of interna-
tional fiscal competition because mobility costs are much lower, the lower the government
level such that the potential for fiscal competition strongly increases. If fiscal competition
turns out to be at least not harmful to economic outcomes of jurisdictions at the lower level of
governments, it is probably having similar effects in international terms.
The studies for the U.S. broadly support the migration hypothesis (see Feld 2000 for a sur-
vey). They find that tax rate differentials and differences in public services across U.S. states
and local jurisdictions – ceteris paribus – influence individual residence choices. Welfare
payments mainly affect migration of the poor. However, many studies also provide evidence
that labor market conditions or the housing market are quantitatively more important than
fiscal policy. In addition, the attraction of jurisdictions with favorable public or private infra-
structure (in particular health and education) as well as a good quality of the natural environ-
ment (parks and other recreation facilities) should not be underestimated. The differences in
tax rates and public services at the state or local levels moreover capitalize in housing prices
(see Feld and Kirchgässner 1997 and again Feld 2000 for surveys on the U.S. studies). Higher
taxes induce – ceteris paribus – lower housing prices, while a higher level of public services
is associated with higher housing prices. The tax burden is shifted to the immobile factor land.
Similar evidence on fiscally induced migration is found for Switzerland. Frey (1981) reports
only a small or no impact of income tax rate differentials on migration between and within
Swiss cantons. Feld (2000) finds stronger effects for cantonal immigration between 1980 and
1990, but the results are not very robust to the inclusion of additional influences on migration.
In an alternative approach, the impact of income taxes and public services on the distribution
of taxpayers in different income classes across the Swiss cantons and local jurisdictions has
been investigated. Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) in a cross section analysis for the
Swiss cantons in 1987, Pommerehne, Kirchgässner and Feld (1996), Feld (1999, 2000,
2000a), Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) in cross section analysis for the Swiss cantons and for
137 Swiss cities and communities for 1990 as well as Feld and Frey (2000) in a panel data
analysis for the cantons between 1981/82 and 1993/94 report a strong impact of income taxes
on the distribution of taxpayers. The impact of income tax rate differentials is quantitatively
more important in higher than in lower income classes. Tax competition appears to be more
intense at the local than at the cantonal level and more important for self-employed than for
dependent workers and for retirees. These results on the impact of public finance for the re-
gional distribution of taxpayers is corroborated by the Swiss studies on capitalization of tax– 12 –
rate differentials in housing prices. Feld and Kirchgässner (1997), Hilber (1998) and Feld
(2000) report that the higher income taxes, the lower are dwelling rents of apartments and
houses. The income tax burden of high income taxpayers is capitalized more strongly than
that of low income people. Welfare does not play any role. All in all, there is strong evidence
from the regional level that fiscally induced migration and residence choice takes place. The
migration hypothesis can thus not be rejected.
3.3. Empirical Evidence on Strategic Fiscal Policy
Fiscally induced migration is a necessary condition for the existence of fiscal competition. A
sufficient condition is the strategy hypothesis: Jurisdictions actually engage in strategic tax
setting. How strategic tax setting emerges can be easily illustrated in the following example:
In his tax policy, the Austrian finance minister has to consider several requirements many of
which are derived from Austrian legislation or from EU law, and others stem from the influ-
ence of different interest groups on tax policy. In addition, he has to consider the international
development in order to make Austria attractive for investments and locations of firms. If the
Slovak Republic decreases its tax rate on individual and personal income to, say, 19 percent,
the Austrian finance minister has to take that into account when announcing the next tax re-
form. Countries apparently look at what happens in other countries, or more generally speak-
ing in other jurisdictions. They identify their competitors and react to their tax rate changes.
According to the strategy hypothesis, the correlation between the changes of tax rates in dif-
ferent jurisdictions should be positive, i.e. if a country reduces individual and corporate in-
come tax rates, another country reduces these rates as well.
Evidence on such a strategic tax setting exists, like for the location choice of firms, at all gov-
ernment levels. The first studies have again been conducted for the U.S. states and local juris-
dictions (Ladd 1992, Case 1993, Brueckner and Saavedra 2001), but there is meanwhile also
evidence on strategic tax setting in Canada (Brett and Pinske 2000 for municipalities and Ha-
yashi and Boadway 2000 for provinces), Belgian communities (Heyndels and Vuchelen
1998), German local jurisdictions  (Büttner 1999, 2001), French regions and départements
(Feld, Josselin and Rocaboy 2003, Leprince, Madiès and Paty 2003), Italian cities (Bor-
dignon, Cerniglia and Revelli 2003), Spanish local jurisdictions (Solé-Ollé 2003) and Swiss
cantons (Feld and Reulier 2001). Most of these studies focus on income, business and prop-
erty taxation. They find that a reduction of the average tax rates of competitors induces a re-
duction of tax rates of an observed jurisdiction. Comparable evidence is presented by Figlio,
Kolpin and Reid (1999) and Saavedra (2000) on welfare payments in the U.S. Again, reduc-
tions in welfare payments on average in competitor jurisdictions induce a reduction of welfare
payments in an observed jurisdiction. Moreover, Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) provide
evidence on strategic interaction in environmental policy.
Most notably, such evidence could also be found at the international level. Devereux, Lock-
wood and Redoano (2001) analyze strategic tax setting for ten OECD countries between 1979
and 1999. They find that there is a positive spatial correlation between statutory corporate
income taxes of these countries as well as between their effective average corporate income
tax rates. The lower these tax rates in the other nine countries on average is, the lower are the
tax rates in the remaining ten country. Besley, Griffith and Klemm (2001) corroborate these– 13 –
results in a study on corporate income tax ratios (tax revenue in percent of GDP) for 29
OECD countries between 1965 and 1997. Again, a positive spatial correlation of taxes exists.
Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) provide additional evidence on how the U.S. serves as a role
model in international tax policy whose tax reforms are imitated by European countries.
On the basis of this evidence, the strategy hypothesis cannot be rejected. Fiscal competition
exists at the local, regional and international level at different intensities concerning different
production factors. It is most intense at the local level in countries with local or regional fiscal
autonomy. At the regional level, the intensity is lower compared with the local level, but
higher compared to the international level. The evidence provides strong support for the exis-
tence of fiscal competition for firms and individual taxpayers and hence for corporate and
individual income taxes as well as property taxes (the latter in particular in the U.S.). Interna-
tional evidence on fiscal competition is provided for corporate income taxation, but not for
individual income taxation or for public spending.
4. Actual Effects of Fiscal Competition
Stating that fiscal competition exists does not tell anything about its impact on the supply of
public services, the welfare state or economic growth. These three classes of economic out-
comes must be considered explicitly. However, no systematic international evidence on the
impact of fiscal competition on these economic outcomes exists. The empirical studies have
only been conducted for the federal countries Switzerland and the U.S. using regional or local
data. What has been said in Section 3.2 however also holds with respect to economic out-
comes: If fiscal competition is more intense at the local or regional level, the hypothesized
positive or negative effects should be more easily observed in studies on federal states. In a
‚Sinatra-analogy‘, we can state: ‚If you can make it there, you can make it anywhere.‘
4.1. Fiscal Competition and the Efficiency of Public Goods’ Provision
To measure economic efficiency in the provision of public goods is not easy. Public services
are efficiently provided if the marginal cost of provision is equal to the sum of marginal rates
of substitution of users. Though it is not impossible, finding out the marginal cost of provision
is difficult, because most statistics on the public sector contain information on expenditure
and not on cost. The real difficulty emerges however on the demand side. Consumers have
incentives to hide their true willingness to pay for public services in order to get a free ride
when they expect to pay actually. Consequently, direct evidence on the impact of fiscal com-
petition on the efficiency of public goods’ provision is relatively scarce.
The first evidence stems from a study by Bergstrom, Roberts, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1988)
who directly estimate the equality of marginal costs of provision of public services and the
sum of individual marginal willingnesses to pay for public education (that is financed by
property taxes in the U.S.). The demand for public services is estimated on the basis of indi-
vidual survey data. In addition, aggregate data on local jurisdictions is used to assess marginal
costs. The authors present evidence that the efficiency hypothesis according to which fiscal
competition leads to an efficient decentralized provision of public goods cannot be rejected.
Hoxby (2000) develops a less ambitious test by comparing the relative efficiency of education– 14 –
in jurisdictions with a higher and those with a lower intensity of fiscal competition. She pres-
ents evidence that the performance of students per input unit is increased by fiscal competi-
tion although it leads to significantly less spending per student. There is also evidence for
Switzerland that fiscal decentralization is associated with a higher individual satisfaction of
citizens with their lives in general (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 2002). Fiscal competition hence
appears to increase the efficiency of public education.
In addition, there is a broad discussion in the literature on the impact of fiscal competition on
the size of government. According to Brennan and Buchanan (1980), fiscal competition is a
means to restrict Leviathan behavior of governments: „The potential for fiscal exploitation
varies inversely with the number of competing governmental units in the inclusive territory.“
(p. 185). Most studies attempt at testing this hypothesis by looking at the impact of fiscal de-
centralization on public spending or revenue. There is only mixed evidence on this impact of
fiscal decentralization however. Only the more recent evidence by Shadbegian (1999) for the
U.S., Schaltegger (2001) and Kirchgässner (2002) for Switzerland and Rodden (2003) in a
cross-country study provides unambiguous support for such a relationship. Feld, Kirchgässner
and Schaltegger (2003) focus more closely on the transmission channels by which fiscal de-
centralization in federal states might affect the size of government. They find that a more in-
tense tax competition leads to lower public revenue.
In the theoretical discussion, externalities of fiscal competition are focused. Büttner (2003)
reports relatively important fiscal externalities for small communities in Germany. Murdoch,
Sandler and Sargent (1997) find evidence on the importance of negative benefit spillovers
(sulfur and NOx emissions) for 25 European states. As Sørensen (2000, 2004) in his simula-
tion study shows, these fiscal and regional externalities can easily compensate for each other.
Parry (2003) corroborates this analysis and also reports relatively low welfare costs of tax
competition even excluding tax exporting. Hence the importance of externalities can be ques-
tioned. Pommerehne, Feld and Hart (1994), with evidence on local cross-border pollution, and
Pommerehne and Krebs (1991), with evidence on spillovers of public services in the canton
of Zurich, show how regional externalities are successfully internalized in Coase-like bar-
gaining processes. Swiss federalism is in general characterized by specific inter-jurisdictional
compensations for spillovers. Although this leads to high transaction costs it also induces in-
centive compatibility of public goods’ provision. Indeed, Schaltegger (2003) does not find
any significant benefit spillovers between Swiss cantons in a panel study for the years 1980 to
1998. All in all, this evidence speaks in favor of fiscal competition. The efficiency hypothesis
cannot be rejected on the basis of this evidence.
4.2. Fiscal Competition and the Welfare State
What is really surprising is the evidence on the redistribution hypothesis in its strong version
according to which fiscal competition leads to a collapse of the welfare state. Remember that
the supposed mechanism is a fiscally induced migration of the poor to jurisdictions with high
transfers and the rich to jurisdictions with low income taxes – keeping all other factors con-
stant that might attract migrants. As discussed in Section 3.2, this fiscally induced migration
takes place in the U.S. and, to a lesser extent with respect to welfare payments at least, also in
Switzerland. There is additional evidence on strategic tax setting in both countries. There is– 15 –
however no evidence that the welfare state in both countries has collapsed – given national
redistribution preferences. This is particularly interesting for Switzerland because of its more
pronounced income redistribution.
On the basis of data from 1977, Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) present evidence that
two thirds of public income redistribution (without considering social security in that analy-
sis) were conducted by sub-federal jurisdictions. The income distribution was not signifi-
cantly more unequal for Switzerland in 1977 than in Germany in the beginning of the seven-
ties. Since the seventies, the Swiss income distribution has become more unequal than in
other European countries. This development can be attributed to the fact that the ten percent
of the population with the highest incomes have more than proportionally gained from income
growth between 1977 and 1992. Still, excluding social security, the Swiss public sector redis-
tributes as much income in 1992 as in the end of the seventies. The share of sub-federal juris-
dictions from this amount of income redistribution has even increased during the same period
(Feld 2000, 2000a). In addition, cantons and local jurisdictions have relied more strongly on
taxes than on spending to accomplish income redistribution. Although Feld, Fischer and
Kirchgässner (2003) find some evidence that tax competition between cantons is actually
leading to less income redistribution, this effect is not robust to the primary distribution of
income. The strong redistribution hypothesis must therefore be rejected for Switzerland.
It should be noted that the most important differences between fiscal competition in federal
states on the one hand and international fiscal competition on the other hand must be attrib-
uted to the distribution branch. The Swiss cantons and local jurisdictions as well as the U.S.
states and local jurisdictions are indeed embedded in a system where much income redistri-
bution is undertaken by the federal level. The public acceptance of the effects of fiscal com-
petition on the income distribution thus hinges on the fact that there is some redistribution of
income at the federal level. In Switzerland, the progressive federal income tax, the source tax
on interest income and the pay-as-you-go part of the Swiss pension system are centralized and
have a strong redistributive impact. Similarly, the U.S. federal income tax is most important
for income redistribution. In addition, both countries had strong residence requirements for
longer time periods. As it is well documented by the U.S. studies on migration and welfare
(Moffitt, 1992), residential requirements could be crucial for decentralized redistribution to
work. Until 1969, the U.S. states imposed residence requirements on potential welfare recipi-
ents according to which they could only obtain welfare payments in a state if they had worked
at least two years in the same state in which they applied for social welfare. The residence
requirement was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in that year. Evidence for a
harmful welfare migration has been provided only for the period after that Supreme Court
decision. In Switzerland, a citizenship principle existed until 1979 according to which the
places of citizenship were responsible for social welfare of their citizens. Citizenship has been
inherited. If the place of residence of a welfare recipient was different from the place of citi-
zenship, he could be forced to move back in the place of citizenship or obtained lower transfer
payments than he would have received at the place of residence. Finally the Swiss political
decision-making process plays a role for income redistribution. Since Swiss cantons to dif-
fering degrees enable voters to participate directly in fiscal decision-making by referenda on
tax rates, spending or budget deficits, and because institutional competition of direct with rep-– 16 –
resentative democratic cantons induces the latter to deviate not too much from basic redis-
tributive concerns, fiscal competition in Switzerland may not lead to a collapse of the welfare
state as well. Actually, tax competition is less pronounced in cantons with a tax referendum
than in those without one (Feld 1997).
4.3. Economic Growth, Regional Convergence and Political Innovation
The impact of fiscal competition on economic growth is even less intensively studied than
that on efficiency or income redistribution. There is a more recent literature mainly with
cross-country evidence, but also with evidence on Chinese provinces, German or U.S. states
that attempts at analyzing whether fiscal decentralization has a positive or negative impact on
economic growth. The main disadvantage of the empirical approach in those studies is that
fiscal decentralization is almost exclusively measured by the share of spending (or revenue)
of lower level jurisdictions from total spending (or revenue). This share is not measuring fis-
cal autonomy. It could easily be the case that sub-federal jurisdictions spend a relatively large
share, but are forced to do so by federal mandates or do not raise funds autonomously to fi-
nance that spending such that they depend on the federal government. This holds for example
for Mexico (Feld 2003). It is thus not surprising that the existing studies do not find any clear-
cut evidence on this relationship (Feld, Zimmermann and Döring 2003). There is one paper in
which the impact of tax competition on economic performance is analyzed. Feld, Kirchgäss-
ner and Schaltegger (2004) present evidence for the Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 that tax
competition has not been harmful to economic performance of the cantons. In addition, no
evidence on the importance of economies of scale for economic performance is found in that
study. The arguments for a merger of cantons are thus not supported by the evidence from this
paper. Still no evidence on the impact of fiscal competition on regional convergence exists.
With respect to the impact of fiscal competition on political innovation only evidence from
case studies can be found. Feld and Schnellenbach (2004) discuss the diffusion of administra-
tion reforms (new public management) at the Swiss local level during the nineties and the
welfare reform of the U.S. in 1996. In particular, the latter example has been explicitly con-
ducted with the expectation of the federal government that the states as a laboratory for wel-
fare policies are better suited to find the most reasonable solutions for welfare policy. Al-
though the welfare reform is a success story and the expectations are thus not disappointed, it
must be noted that there are still federal mandates aiming at a quality control of these reforms.
The U.S. welfare reform is hence not exclusively providing evidence for the success of fiscal
competition in inducing political innovation. Much needs to be done to get a more conclusive
picture in this area.
5. Policy Conclusions
In policy debates across Europe, tax competition is perceived very skeptical. Most finance
ministers would rather harmonize taxes than allow for tax competition. They fear that mobile
tax bases will not contribute to the financing of European welfare states anymore. In this pa-
per, the main theoretical arguments are discussed and evaluated as to what impact tax compe-
tition has on the provision of public services, on income redistribution by the state and on– 17 –
economic development. Moreover, the arguments from the theoretical analysis are confronted
with the existing empirical evidence. Several conclusions can be drawn from that analysis:
1.  It is misleading to talk about tax competition. Taxes are prices for public services and the
public insurance provided by welfare states. Governments find themselves in a locational
competition of which fiscal competition is an important part. It is also misleading to trace
the development of statutory or average effective tax rates over time without controlling
other factors that affect location or residence choices. Tax ratios computed as tax revenue
in percent of GDP are not useful to even measure tax burdens of production factors.
2.  The international evidence and the evidence from federal states provides overwhelming
evidence that fiscal competition exists. Firms’ international or regional location choices –
ceteris paribus – depend on corporate and personal income tax rate differentials and on
differences in public services. Taxes also play a significant role for the choice of transfer
prices of multinational firms. The higher taxes, the less attractive a jurisdiction is for mo-
bile capital. Residence choices similarly depend on personal income taxes, public infra-
structure and welfare payments. The evidence for the latter mainly stems from
interregional fiscal competition in federal states. International evidence does not exist.
Being aware of fiscally induced migration, governments engage in strategic tax setting
and enter a process of tax and welfare competition.
3.  The theoretical arguments on the impact of fiscal competition mainly focus on the effi-
ciency of public goods’ provision and the sustainability of decentralized income redistri-
bution. While there are contradictory hypotheses on efficiency, fiscal competition is hy-
pothesized to render decentralized income redistribution impossible. The empirical evi-
dence speaks in favor of the efficiency enhancing effect of fiscal competition, while the
deterioration of income redistribution is not necessarily found. It strongly depends on the
rules shaping income redistribution. In particular residence requirements appear to be
useful.
4.  The impact of fiscal competition on economic growth and regional convergence is neither
theoretically nor empirically sufficiently analyzed. It appears that neither fiscal harmoni-
zation with intergovernmental grants, nor fiscal competition can have big impacts on
convergence or divergence of regions because it more strongly depends on agglomeration
economies, economies of scale and transport costs. The few studies undertaken on this
relationship indicate that fiscal competition is at least not harmful for economic perform-
ance.
5.  Perhaps the most important effects of fiscal competition stem from the political innova-
tion it induces. Fiscal competition forces governments to find new policy solutions and
experiment with them in a decentralized way. The successful policy innovations succeed
in a process of imitation and adaptation. Policy innovation means policy reform. Some
case studies indicate that the innovation enhancing effects of fiscal competition are in-
deed realistic. Much more research needs to be done in this area. Political reforms are
very important for European welfare states.– 18 –
Is tax competition harmful or useful? After a broad review of the main theoretical arguments
and the empirical evidence, the answer is: It is rather useful than harmful. Europe does not
need a harmonization of tax or social policy.
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